Introduction
When a person is injured, society has almost always felt that compensation is appropriate. Payment to the person for medical and other costs; payment to the survivors for loss of a loved one and bread winner. But who should pay the compensation when it is uncertain who to blame? Should society pay compensation if the cause of the injury is unclear? Should a person who develops a cancer from natural causes receive as much from society as a person who develops a cancer from an anthropogenic cause? These questions are as old as the hills. Society is now facing the issue of what to do when the cause is unclear, particularly in compensation for radiation exposure. Anyone using ionizing radiation, should be aware of the way this is developing in their country.
I here distinguish three approaches to the subject, each of which is adopted in different circumstances. The first applies only to medical costs, which are often large. A country can have a National Health Service, and provide medical care to all who need it, regardless of the cause of injury or ailment. Then there is no need even to consider who is to blame. A second is an administrative procedure to assign causation and blame. It is hoped that the procedure will be more reliable than the one that condemned Jonah. A typical example is the enactment of laws for workmens' compensation. Thirdly society can leave the assignment of compensation to the courts with the working of tort law. In this short article I will primarily address the second of these -in particular the thorny question of what society may want, and what several societies actually do, when the cause or the person to blame are unclear.
The risk that a person is killed while crossing the road can become a certainty (probability of death 100%) if and when he or she actually dies. It makes no sense to ask what his risk is. When a harmful event has occurred, however, one can ask: What is the probability that the event -disease or death -was due to a particular action or pollutant? The quantity is often called the Probability of Causation or POC. If a person is lying dead in a road, and traces of their clothing are on the bumper of a car that has just stopped, attribution of the death to the cause "automobile accident" is comparatively simple (although investigators must be aware that the collision may not be the "root cause," because for example, an accident might be fabricated to cover up a murder). When a disease such as cancer follows the postulated cause by many years, however, attribution is harder but often still possible.
Major difficulty arises when a person has a disease which has a number of possible causes. The assignment of causation can then be expressed only on a probabilistic basis. The compensation of persons exposed to radiation presents just such a problem. Merely by looking at a cancer it is not now possible, and may be ultimately proven impossible, to tell whether radiation was the cause or whether other processes including natural processes, were the cause. It is necessary to understand whether or not there was an exposure large enough to cause the cancer. A mere diagnosis of the disease, therefore, cannot be used to assign a cause. The cause must be estimated in a probabilistic manner taking account of the exposure and natural incidence of the cancer in question (Bond, 1981; Mettler and Upton, 1995; Rothman, 1986, p 38 ).
Calculation of POC
The Probability of Causation that an outcome O is caused by exposure E s to a specified substance s, can be expressed in an equation: POC = (The risk calculated from the estimated exposure to the substance s) divided by (The risk from all causes)
All causes include both the natural incidence and the risk calculated from exposure to the substance. If the risk from all causes can be expressed as a sum of risks from a number of k different substances i, the calculation follows at once from the theorem, attributed to the Reverend Thomas Bayes in the 18 th century, that describes how to change a probability when new information is available. Inserting the exposure variable E i and the outcome O instead of the variables used in the textbooks:
It must be recognized that both the numerator and the denominator vary with a number of characteristics of the person: is he a smoker? Male or female? What is his diet? Is he genetically sensitive? young or old? Although we ask for the POC for an individual, in most cases we can only obtain values of the quantities averaged over a population. This inevitably leads to approximations. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) has prepared, and is updating, a set of epidemiological tables for such situations (NCI, 1985; . They define excess risk [ERR(O|E i )] as the increase in probability of the outcome due to the dose s divided by the incidence averaged throughout the USA (from the [Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results ] SEER data). The numerator is derive from models depending mostly ion tumor rates in Japan.. Then they express POC in terms of the "Excess Risk" defined by the formula:
To be precise, the excess risk must be derived from a population with the same characteristics as the person under study. But data inevitably are averages, and in this case the numerator and the denominator come from countries with different racial characteristics. NCI calculates POC for a person who received a radiation dose D at age t and developed a cancer at age T.
But there is a much more important assumption in the preparation of these tables. At low doses of radiation, these tables assume that the response to the radiation dose is linear (linear-no-threshold -the LNT hypothesis). Just as the risk of the adverse response is uncertain when the dose is small, so is the Probability of Causation. This raises the new issue of what to do when the POC is so uncertain. That makes it essential for scientists and technologists to understand what society is deciding and to use their especial expertise to influence the procedure.
Various authors have discussed the details and approximations in discussing these concepts and deriving the relevant values of excess risk and other parameters from epidemiological data (Lagakos and Mosteller, 1986; Cox, 1987; Greenland and Robins, 1988; Robins and Greenland, 1989) . For example, the formula for POC is negative if the risk calculated for the exposure E is negative (corresponding to a beneficial effect), whereas no probability can be negative. When the risk is negative, (meaning that the exposure is beneficial) it can be set equal to zero in the equation. Nonetheless, these details complicate the picture somewhat, and several authors have suggested that the words, "assigned share" be used instead of "Probability of Causation." Even this runs into difficulties, however, when synergistic effects of two substances, such as asbestos and smoking are considered (Grimson 1987) . Each POC calculated from the equation is still below unity, as required for a probability, but the sum of the POC for the two possible causes can exceed unity, because the two are not independent. The sum of two "assigned shares" cannot exceed unity, however, and the use of "assigned share" makes no sense in such a situation.
Uses of POC
Once the POC has been calculated the science itself ends. What one does with the information is the policy matter for which the public is ill prepared (Upton and Wilson 2000) . Throwing the accused overboard into the mouth of a whale is now considered to be inappropriate. Cases of legal liability tend to be governed by a rule that it must be "more likely than not" that the postulated cause is the correct one. "More likely than not " should mean that POC be greater than 50%.
But society might well choose a different procedure for regulatory and administrative purposes than for issues of legal liability. The law tends to be determined by a desire to avoid "trivial" lawsuits. There are many examples where legislatures have used a rule different from the legal one. This has particularly arisen in cases of worker's compensation. There have been enough situations where workers have been exploited that there is a common sentiment to compensate workers even when POC has not been calculated. A discussion of various heuristics for discussing causation in occupational situations has been made by Harber and Shusterman (1996) . Several of these heuristics accept the idea that one should compensate when a large risk is observed, even when POC has not been explicitly calculated and attribution not certain.
For example in Massachusets and several other states, there used to be a "heart law." It is assumed that firemen and policemen are under sufficient stress that any heart attack is presumed to be caused by the job and is compensable. Moreover, in an occupational setting a high exposure to a chemical that is being used was not uncommon in the recent past (unlike radiation, where a high exposure is very rare and mostly confined to accidents) and is often assumed. Common sense prevails, however, even in legislatures. Administrative procedures can be modified when new information and understanding arrive. When it was realized that a major cause of heart attacks was cigarette smoking, pressure arose to abolish the heart law. This was resisted and instead the trade unions concerned agreed that their members would be nonsmokers.
Compensating cancer victims in an occupational setting can also follow compensation procedures similar to those under the heart law. Here, however, it is desirable to calculate specifically the Probability of Causation and to use it to decide whom to compensate. Armstrong et al.(1988) discussed the procedure for compensating cancer victims in aluminum plants in Canada. The Quebec Worker's Compensation Board (CSST) decided to compensate workers whose POC exceeded 50% .
Compensation for actual cancers that might be caused by radiation can follow the same procedure. Wakeford et al. (1998) describe a procedure used in the U.K. whereby compensation is paid to exposed radiation workers if the calculated POC is greater than 20%. The choice of 20%, rather than 50% was chosen to be "generous" to the workers and to encourage arbitration (using this procedure) rather than court action.
In another situation the U.S. Congress responded to concern from veteran "downwinders", that they had developed cancer from being "downwind" of atomic bomb tests, Congress (1983) specifically requested the National Cancer Institute to prepare tables so that the POC could be evaluated for these . Subsequently, Congress (1984) directed the Veterans administration, in an amendment to the orphan drug act, to establish compensation standards for radiation exposure claims from these veterans.
The Veterans Administration chose to adapt the radioepidemiological tables NCI had developed, to provide an uncertainty distribution for the dose that gives POC = 50%, and to use the upper 99th percentile as a "screening dose" for compensation, with the actual compensation to vary with the actual POC. The POC calculated for these "down winders" was lower than 50% in almost all cases. Congress (1988) then passed a law awarding compensation regardless of dose to any veteran with a cancer of a type that is known to be increased by high radiation doses -and specifically listed in the legislation. This presumptive legislation seems to have been a political decision based upon a deep public feeling that the atom bomb tests were wrong and society must make amends. Scientists and scientific societies were not directly consulted. The sentiment and procedure seems similar to that in the "heart law" referred to above.
The attempts to put a scientific veneer onto the procedure suggested that radiation exposure is more dangerous than it is. Fortunately when President Reagan signed the bill, compensating workers at selected DOE laboratories regardless of dose or POC, and into law, accepting the risk management procedure based upon other societal values, he made a small attempt to improve public perception by stating that neither the bill nor his signature should imply that radiation actually caused the cancers which were being compensated. This was based, in part on a suggestion by Edward Teller and me to the President.
Later this presumptive compensation was extended by Congress (1990) to apply to certain other eligible "downwinders" -persons living in the states downwind, uranium miners and other veterans.
The latest application of this procedure came in the year 2000, when Congress passed an amendment to the defense authorization bill (Congress 2000) extending this concept of compensating whenever the dose exceeded the upper 99th percentile of the distribution of the dose at which POC =50%. This had been discussed by an interagency group during the fall and winter of 1999-2000. This group was devoid of scientific experts on the issue, and they were not consulted. This did not stop the Secretary of Energy from leaking information to the press at a number of speeches. Some knowledgeable scientists enquired about the procedure, by polite letter, by angry letter, or by Freedom of Information Act request. None of these received a useful response, however, and it can be reasonably surmised that the scientists were deliberately kept in the dark.
In April 2000, DOE held a press conference to release the proposal (DOE 2000) . Although DOE officials stated that they intend to use scientific procedures, it remains to be seen how the secretary of Department of Labor, Elaine Chao, and the DOE will administer and explain the procedures. The Congressional hearings in September 2000 were again devoid of scientific and technical discussion. This absence even of an explanation of an overriding societal "value judgment", suggests that the DOE used a risk analysis procedure to"justify" a decision already made rather than to illuminate a decision not yet made. Risk analysts decry such procedures. Interestingly, such charges are more usually leveled at the EPA's superfund program. Worse still, President Clinton, in signing this bill into law, missed the opportunity to repeat President Reagan's cautionary words denying a scientific justification. While one cannot argue scientifically against Congress compensating who it will, it is worth examining some ramifications of the procedure.
The ramifications of diverging from a simple application of the rule that compensation applies only when the calculated POC is 50%or higher are numerous. At POC =50% it is usually well determined from observational (epidemiological) data. When an upper 99th percentile is used, or equivalently a value of POC of 5%to 10%is chosen, the value depends critically on the uncertain theoretical extrapolation to zero. Problems particularly arise for the rarer cancers such as leukemia where the denominator (prevalence) is small. For example, even five years of chest X rays in the 1950s, with the doses then usual of 1 rem per chest X ray, would in principle allow most leukemia victims to claim compensation. For an even rarer disease such as mesothelioma, almost any occupational exposure to asbestos would be enough to establish causation, and indeed the usual interpretation of the plots of mesothelioma incidence with time suggest that 70%of the mesothelioma incidence in males, and 20% in females, is caused by the high occupational exposures of 30 years ago (Price and Wilson, 2001 ).
But the same principle applied to medical end points other than cancer (Crawford and Wilson, 1996) raises even more societal issues. For example, the DOE in providing compensation could consider compensating those members of the public adversely affected by one of its major suppliers -the local electricity company -in addition to the employees of direct contractors. At Portsmouth and Paducah the electricity was produced by coal burning power plants which in the relevant period of the 1960s had very inadequate pollution control. It is in the Ohio Valley, at Steubenville, that the largest increase in death rates from respiratory diseases was found by the Harvard Six Cities study of air pollution (Wilson and Spengler, 1996) . Many scientists believe that this increase (of about 50%),compared to less polluted areas, is causally related to air pollution in the Ohio Valley. This increase leads to a POC (roughly averaged over the whole population of the area) of about 30%.Undoubtedly it is higher for many individuals. The DOE workers already had some compensation for their exposures -their salaries -but the general public did not. Not mentioned in the discussion is the fact that the dose to many of the DOE workers cannot be obtained solely from the film badge they wore at work. At Hanford, for example, the dose from the medical diagnostic X rays exceeded the dose from the occupation and was not explicitly recorded. (Shhab-Eldin, Shlyakhter and Wilson 1992) . Should DOE pay the compensation or some medical agency?
A cutcoff at 50%or any particular figure seems arbitrary and hard to justify. How sure is society that someone whose POC is 50.1% should be compensated and someone whose POC is 49.9% should not? This paradox has led several people to propose compensation on a sliding scale (Bond 1981; Upton and Wilson 2000) . Society (or a court)could decide on a for the disease in question (perhaps $500,000) and pay a fraction of this equal to $500,000 x POC, with perhaps a "de minimis" cutoff at some value of POC or suitable sum of money. This would avoid a conundrum that would occur if an improvement in scientific understanding changed the POC from 50.1%to 49.9%. But the decision on what constitutes adequate compensation would have to be independent of the POC calculation. A proportionate use of POC would as noted above, this is the procedure used by Wakeford et al. (1998) have the additional advantage of automatically allowing, in a simple way, assignments of compensation to multiple causes or situations where cumulative exposure to a single substance is the cause, but there are many contributors to the cumulative exposure. The courts are ahead of scientists, experts in public policy and politicians in considering this matter.
In asbestos litigation it may well be possible to argue that POC is greater than 50% for asbestos as a cause, but the assignment of the blame to individual asbestos suppliers leads to individual POCs for individual asbestos suppliers less than 50%.In Rutherford (1997) the court held that plaintiffs may prove causation in asbestos related cancer cases by demonstrating that the plaintiff's exposure to a defendant's asbestos containing product to a reasonable medical probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff or decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestos related cancer, without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the defendant's particular product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth.
Compensation for exposures
Compensation merely for exposure has its attractive features. If a person is going to die prematurely, surely he would prefer to have the compensation before death so that his last years may be more enjoyable? In Russia, authorities provided compensation for radiation exposures before cancers appeared in the cases of radiation accidents at the Techa River, Kyshtym and Chornobyl (Vasilev et al. 2001) . Such compensation has been proposed by both U.S. and international authorities for radiation accidents. Radiation exposure is comparatively easy to evaluate. Workers usually carry personal monitors (dosimeters) and the radioactive materials leave their signature. At the Techa River accident, the dominant dose was from Sr90, and at Chornobyl it was Cs 137. But past exposure to chemicals is much harder to measure. Nonetheless, this can be done, even though the uncertainty is often much greater than in the radiation case, making it hard to regulate on the upper 99 th percentile of the uncertainty distribution. It is clear that extension of compensation to exposures, rather than actual cancers, raises many more issues.
In all of this, I feel it is wise to aspire to consistency between all possible agents and actions that cause injury or disease. This demand is greater than the legal demand of following precedent. While Emerson once said that "foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds" I believe it is the duty of a risk analyst to point out inconsistencies so that if they are retained they are retained deliberately. It is even more the duty of publicly elected and appointed officials to explain to the public why any particular decision may not be consistent with the general policy.
Does it all make sense?
After following a complex chain of argument it is useful to stand back and ask: does it all make sense? In some situations compensation may be inappropriate, even when POC is large. Compensation is obviously inappropriate if a chemotherapy agent, deliberately taken to cure one disease, causes a cancer later. But there may be other inappropriate situations. I have had several large radiation exposures before the age of 35, almost all from diagnostic X rays. When I compare these exposures to the radioepidemiological tables (NIH 1985) , I find that if I had developed leukemia by the age of 35, the POC would have been about 50%. This high figure arises because the incidence of leukemia is low at young ages and appears in the denominator of the equation. This suggests that someone should undertake an explicit epidemiological study of a cohort of men and women who had X-rays between 1930 and 1955. Maybe such a study could disprove the risk. Meanwhile, maybe I would have been able to collect compensation. But from whom? The shoe store that repeatedly X-rayed my feet in 1932 for my childhood amusement? The UK medical community that demanded my early X-rays? The U.S. State Department who X-rayed me for my visas? The Office of Naval Research and the Atomic Energy Commission which X-rayed me before employment to ensure that I was healthy? According to Rutherford, they should all be prepared for the consequences of applying the present procedures.
